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Abstract
This paper studies the costs and benefits of the adoption of a policy of free movement of workers.
For countries to agree on uncontrolled movements of workers, short run costs must be outweighed
by the long term benefits of better labor market flexibility and income smoothing. We show that
such a policy is less likely to be adopted when workers are more impatient and less risk averse,
when production technologies display stronger decreasing returns and when countries trade a
significant share of their products.
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1 Introduction
Since its inception, the European Union has aimed at implementing a policy of free movement of
workers between member states (Article 45, E.U. Lisbon Treaty). However, some E.U. member states
have been reluctant to implement this policy, implementing it in stages, applying different standards of
implementation, or in some cases applying policies as restrictive as for non-E.U. immigrants. Similar
projects and difficulties have emerged in other country associations like the North American Free
Trade Area (N.A.F.T.A.) in which the TN-status currently allows the free movement of workers only
between the United States of America and Canada. The main reason for this reluctance lies in the
fear that inflows of migrant workers may depress local labor market conditions and lower the welfare
of the host country’s workers.1
It is not difficult to find evidence for why country associations might aim for a policy of free
movement of workers and fail to agree on it. Migration offers large benefits to the immigrants (see, for
example, Klein and Ventura, 2009; Clemens et al., 2010) but imposes short run costs to local workers,
particularly to the low skilled ones (see, for example, Borjas, 2003). In this paper, we consider the
balance of short-term costs with long-term benefits and examine the decision of countries to open their
borders and adopt policies of unconditional and uncontrolled movements of workers. The approach we
adopt is similar to the literature on sustaining free trade (see, for example, Bagwell and Staiger, 1990;
Staiger and Bagwell, 1999; Bagwell and Staiger, 2005; Grossman and Helpman, 1995).2 We consider
a repeated model with a simple stochastic structure. To sustain a policy of free movement of workers
requires that no country finds it unilaterally beneficial to breach the policy. As in the sustainable trade
literature, we suppose that a breach leads to reversion to repetition of a short-run Nash equilibrium
where labor migration is completely controlled. Each country therefore weighs the short-run cost of
immigration against the long-term benefits and the policy of free movement of workers is sustainable
if at each date and state the long-term benefits exceed the short-run costs for each country.
To examine this issue, we consider a simple, two-country, dynamic model where, under free move-
ment of labor, workers freely choose their location in each time period. Although our main aim is to
consider the implications of migration and trade together, we proceed in stages to develop the model.
Initially, we consider a model where immigration imposes a cost on locals without specifying how
1In 2005, the referenda rejecting the European Constitution by the Dutch and French publics occurred in the context
of the debate over the accession of Turkey to the E.U. In 2011, the fear of uncontrolled immigration waves has enticed
France to threaten to suspend its obligation to the E.U. freedom of movement (Schengen Treaty) (Waterfield, 2011).
2More generally, our approach relates to the discussion about sustainable government policies (see, for example,
Chari and Kehoe, 1990; Acemoglu et al., 2010) and self-enforcing insurance mechanisms (see, for example, Thomas and
Worrall, 1988; Ligon et al., 2002).
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these costs arise (Sections 2 and 3). Taking the source of this cost as given, we examine how it might
be offset by a long run benefit stemming from a policy of free movement, in which labor markets
are integrated and workers (and their descendants) are able to relocate to more productive countries,
allowing them to smooth their consumption. In considering these costs and benefits, it is important
to take into account a possible externality created by free movement of labor. Free movement will
lead to equalization of utilities in equilibrium, but there is no specific price for the migration decision.
Migrants do not internalize the effect of their move on the productivity and consumption of local
workers. If free movement creates a greater cost in the receiving country than gain in the sending
country, then reducing the extent of migration could increase aggregate welfare: free movement leads
to excessive agglomeration of labor in the receiving country. On the other hand, if free movement cre-
ates a lower cost in the receiving country than gain in the sending country, then increasing the extent
of migration could increase aggregate welfare: free movement leads to under-agglomeration of labor
in the receiving country. Under- or excessive agglomeration decrease the long-run benefits of a policy
of free movement of labor. But they have opposite effects in the short run: excessive agglomeration
increases the short run costs while under-agglomeration ameliorates the short run costs.
It is therefore important to know more about the the relative costs and benefits of a policy of
free movement of labor. We consider these costs and benefits by more precisely specifying the model
in Sections 4 and 5. In Section 4, we examine a standard migration model without trade but with
productivity shocks. If production is iso-elastic, then there is no excessive agglomeration. However,
weaker congestion enhances countries’ incentives to adopt a policy of free movement of workers because
it mitigates the short-run costs of immigration. Similarly, stronger risk aversion enhances countries’
incentives to adopt such a policy because it raises the benefits from income smoothing that the
policy brings. We also show how labor market frictions, in terms of minimum wages, impact on the
sustainability of policies of free movement of labor.
Finally, in Section 5, we discuss the costs and benefits of adopting a policy of free movement of
workers in the presence of international trade. In the Hecksher-Ohlin benchmark, factor prices are
equalized across countries and workers have no incentives to migrate. To discuss migration issues, we
therefore depart from this model and present a simple Ricardo-Viner trade model with production
of both tradeable and non-tradeable goods. Because there is a non-tradeable good and differences in
technologies across countries, factor price equalization does not hold and there will still be an incentive
for migration. As has been recognized by Davis and Weinstein (2002) (see also, Felbermayr and Kohler,
2007), in the presence of trade, migration induces a terms of trade effect. With both tradeable and
non-tradeable goods, the change in the terms of trade caused by migration has an adverse effect on the
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relative import prices and the consumption basket of domestic workers. However, this terms of trade
effect also attenuates the impact of productivity shocks on consumption and reduces workers’ incentives
to move. We show that the presence of trade leads to excessive agglomeration even with iso-elastic
production functions and Cobb-Douglas preferences because migrants do not take into account their
effects on terms of trade. This excess agglomeration is higher for weaker congestion factors and for
lower trade shares. An implication is that there is a trade-off between the trade share and congestion:
weak congestion is good for sustainability of free movement in the standard migration model, but
the presence of trade causes excessive agglomeration, which is bad for sustaining free movement. We
present a parameterized example to illustrate this trade-off. An interesting special case is where there
are no non-tradeable goods, as in Davis and Weinstein (2002). In this case, we show that changes in
the terms of trade fully absorb the shocks and eliminate any migration incentives when countries and
shocks are symmetric. As in Section 4, we also consider the implications of labor market frictions on
the sustainability of policies of free movement of labor.
The main contribution of our paper is threefold. First, as far as we know, this is the first paper to
apply the methods used in modeling sustainable trade, assessing short run costs against long run ben-
efits (as in Bagwell and Staiger, 1990), to the issue of migration. Unlike that literature that considers
optimal tariffs, here we consider only a policy of free movement of labor and not a policy of optimal
controlled migration. We concentrate on the case of free movement of labor of because we believe
this is the relevant case for many countries and because many country associations operate, or are
discussing the operation of, policies of free movement of labor. Second, our model abstracts from many
important factors considered in the migration literature such as skill heterogeneity, skill complemen-
tary in production, physical capital adjustment, voter sentiment, etc. (see, for example, Borjas 2003,
Facchini and Testa 2009, Wahba and Zenou 2012, Ottaviano and Peri 2012). It nevertheless puts at
the forefront uncertainty and intertemporal welfare that are important factors in assessing migration
policy. In particular, it complements the migration literature by studying free migration policies as a
reciprocal mechanism based on the potential benefit of labor market flexibility and income smoothing.
It goes some way to explaining why some of the large gains from migration (identified by Klein and
Ventura 2009 and Clemens et al. 2010) may be difficult to realize. Third, the paper contributes to our
understanding of the interaction of trade and migration and extends in an interesting way the results
of Davis and Weinstein (2002) and Felbermayr and Kohler (2007).
Our analysis combines a standard dynamic framework with limited commitment and standard
trade models to tackle the issue of the adoption of a free movement policy. Yet, this combination is
novel and does improve our understanding of the linkages between migration, trade and sustainability
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of a policy of free movement of workers. The model we adopt is stylized but tractable. Although
the model could be extended and improved, we do think it highlights some reasons why it sometimes
proves difficult to sustain a policy of free movement of workers.
2 The general model
We consider a model with continuum of workers, of mass L¯, distributed over two countries. The home
country has L workers and the foreign country L∗ where L + L∗ = L¯ (an asterisk ∗ denotes foreign
variables). We let L0 denote the initial population of workers in the home country (with L¯ − L0 in
the foreign country). We assume that all workers derive utility from a composite consumption good C
according to an increasing, differentiable and concave utility function U(C). Labor is mobile between
countries and we let l denote the amount of labor working in the local country, whether home or
foreign. As well as mobility of labor between countries, there is uncertainty and we suppose there is a
set of states of nature S ≡ {1, ..., S}. In Sections 4 and 5 we model this uncertainty as deriving from a
productivity shock. For the moment it is useful to think of consumption in the two countries depending
on both the state s and the labor in each country l. In particular, we suppose that the consumption
of domestic and foreign workers is determined by strictly decreasing differentiable functions Cs(l) and
C∗s (l), l ∈ [0, L¯]. Furthermore, we assume a no-crossing property such that for any s ∈ S either
Cs(l) ≥ C∗s (l) for all l ∈ [0, L¯] or Cs(l) ≤ C∗s (l) for all l ∈ [0, L¯]. Microeconomic foundations for
this formulation will be given in the subsequent sections and will include both a labor market and a
tradeable goods market. We first discuss the implications of free labor mobility between countries in
a short-run equilibrium and in a long-run dynamic equilibrium with participation constraints.
2.1 Short-run Equilibrium
We assume that labor movement occurs in response to the observed state of nature. Thus, we can
consider the short-run equilibrium migration decisions for a given state s. Assuming an interior
solution when not all labor flows to one country, free movement of workers implies that utility is equal
in each country. Since all workers are alike and have the same preferences, consumption is equalized
too.3Hence, given that the consumption functions are decreasing, there will be a unique equilibrium
3We assume away moving costs in this text. However, our analysis holds provided that a share of workers face no
moving costs and the average moving cost is not to high. Then, the equalization condition will apply to a marginal
migrant who incurs no mobility cost.
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labor allocation in each state, Ls, that satisfies:
Cs(Ls) = C
∗
s (L¯− Ls).
It follows from the no crossing property that Ls ≥ L∗s if and only if Cs(l) ≥ C∗s (l) for any l ∈ [0, L¯].
That is, population is higher in the country that is favored by the state of nature. It is worth noting
that this equilibrium is Pareto efficient in the sense that there is no possibility to relocate an infinitely
small mass of workers without negatively affecting the utility of some other workers. However, an
interesting question to ask is whether there is too much or too little movement of labor when there is
scope for compensation. To address this question, consider the utilitarian aggregate welfare in state s,
Ws ≡ LsU(Cs(Ls)) + L∗sU(C∗s (L∗s)). The effect on welfare in state s of a marginal increase in labor of
the home country is given by
dWs
dLs
= U (Cs (Ls))− U (C∗s (L∗s)) + LsU ′ (Cs (Ls))C ′s (Ls)− L∗sU ′ (C∗s (L∗s))C∗′s (L∗s) . (1)
Assuming an interior solution, the free movement of workers is efficient if this expression is zero at the
equilibrium. At the equilibrium allocation,there is excess agglomeration in the home country if this
expression is negative and under agglomeration if the expression is positive. Since Cs(Ls) = C
∗
s (L
∗
s)
in equilibrium, the two first terms in (1) cancel out. Hence, there is excess agglomeration in the home
country if and only if
L∗sC
∗′
s (L
∗
s)
LsC ′s (Ls)
< 1. (2)
The free movement equilibrium yields the socially optimal spatial distribution of workers if and only
if the marginal migrant causes a fall in the total domestic consumption (denominator) that is equal to
the increase in the total foreign consumption (numerator). If the former is larger than the latter, there
is excess agglomeration of workers. The marginal welfare valuation of the policy of free movement of
workers does not consider the marginal migrant because the latter has only a second order gain. The
first order gains and losses accrue respectively to the populations that the marginal migrant quits and
joins. There are some specifications of the consumption functions such that free labor movement does
maximize Ws. These include the logarithmic case where Cs(l) = λs ln l for λs > 0 or the iso-elastic
case where Cs(l) = λsl
α for α ∈ (0, 1) and λs > 0. As will be shown in Sections 4 and 5, even with
Cobb-Douglas preferences, the consumption function Cs(l) may not satisfy these conditions when there
are both tradeable and non-tradeable goods.
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2.2 Long-run Equilibrium
We now consider a dynamic version of this model. We focus on a discrete time model with an infinite
horizon. We assume that workers are infinitely lived and have the same discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).4 We
assume that states of nature are i.i.d. across periods and that state s occurs with probability ps > 0
where
∑
s ps = 1. With this assumption and an infinite time horizon, agents’ decisions depend only
on the current state, so that we can analyze all decisions in the current time period and drop the
reference to time. We denote the contemporaneous utility by us(l) ≡ U(Cs(l)) and u∗s(l) ≡ U(C∗s (l)).
Let Vs denote the expected discounted utility of a worker in the home country in state s with V
∗
s
similarly defined for a worker in the Foreign country. With free mobility of labor, workers can choose
where to work and we have
Vs = max{us(Ls) + δEqVq, u∗s(L∗s) + δEqV ∗q }.
The same expression applies to the Foreign worker. Because free movement of workers implies Vs = V
∗
s ,
it follows that us(Ls) = u
∗
s(L
∗
s) and Cs(Ls) = C
∗
s (L
∗
s). Consequently, the equilibrium in the dynamic
model coincides with the sequence of the short-run equilibria.5 Therefore, Vs = V
∗
s = us(Ls) +
(δ/(1− δ))Esus(Ls) where Ls are the short-run equilibrium labor allocations.
It is also possible to consider the welfare properties of this dynamic equilibrium. It is clear, given
our assumptions on mobility and the i.i.d. assumption on states of nature, that a utilitarian planner
will choose the labor allocation in each state where the expression in (1) is equal to zero.6
Thus, our earlier discussion of excess agglomeration applies equally in the static and dynamic cases.
Only for certain specifications of the consumption functions does the free movement of workers coincide
with the socially optimal allocation. Equally, since all workers are alike, if we assume that workers
are randomly allocated across countries, then the ex ante welfare of an individual worker under free
movement will be the same as the utilitarian planner’s objective. To see this, let ωs ≡ Ls/L¯ denote
the probability that a home worker is allocated to the home country and let ω∗s ≡ L∗s/L¯ = 1 − Ls/L¯
be the probability of locating to the foreign country. Then a worker’s ex ante expected utility is
U ≡∑s ps [ωsus(Ls) + ω∗su∗s(L∗s)]. Since the states of nature are independent, the preferred allocation
4Under this assumption agents can also be interpreted as dynasties where each generation has an altruism coefficient
δ.
5This property is valid only under ‘uncontrolled’ movement of workers and greatly eases the nature and the exposition
of our subsequent analysis. It is not valid under ‘controlled’ movement of workers because future utility levels then
differ across countries.
6The utilitarian planner chooses the set of labor allocations {Lts} with time t = 0, ...,∞ that maximizes∑∞
t=0 δ
tEs[L
t
sU(Cs(L
t
s)) + L
∗t
s U(C
∗
s (L¯ − Lts))], which is equivalent to maximizing Ws w.r.t. to Ls and yields the same
labor allocation as in the static model.
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maximizes [Lsus(Ls) + L
∗
su
∗
s(L
∗
s)] /L¯, in each state s. This is proportional to the short-run welfare
objective Ws. Hence, the preferred allocation is where the expression in (1) is equal to zero. By
contrast, the equilibrium expected utility is Es[us(Ls)] =
∑
s psus(Ls). If the expression in (1) is
not equal to zero at the equilibrium allocation, then a policy of controlling worker movement could
improve a worker’s ex ante utility.
3 Sustainable policy
We now study whether policies of free movement of workers will be adopted by the two countries. Here
we assume that the objective of the country coincides with the objective of its (homogenous) workers.
This will be the case if the country takes into account the welfare of its initial L0 citizens and does
not take into account the welfare of migrants into the country. With this objective, immigration has
a short-term cost because it lowers current consumption (given our assumption that Cs(l) is strictly
decreasing). In contrast, provided there are states where workers can achieve higher consumption by
moving to the other country, then there will be long-term benefits from a policy of free movement of
workers.
We define a policy of free movement of workers as the removal of any control over the movement of
workers between countries. More precisely, it is a common policy in which both countries uncondition-
ally grant non-permanent work permits to workers who obtain a job in their jurisdiction. As is typical
of many actual migration policies, these non-permanent work permits are automatically associated
with non-permanent residence permits. In this paper, we keep a distinction between, on the one hand,
work permits and, on the other hand, citizenship and the socioeconomic and political rights that are
associated with citizenship. This distinction is important for two reasons. First, it fixes the group
of individuals that each government considers as its nationals wherever they work and reside. When
workers do not change citizenship or nationality, this group is invariant to the possible relocation of
labor between countries. Second, this distinction determines the alternative policy when countries do
not adopt a policy of free movement of workers or when a country decides to breach such a policy. In
such cases, we assume that the opting out and breaching countries are able to exert a control on the
issue of work permits by putting restrictions and conditions on the number of non-permanent work
permits. As a result, they can stop renewing existing work permits and control the local labor supply.7
7As a very practical case, suppose that a E.U. country decides to leave the E.U. and breach Article 45 on the free
movement of workers. Then, its natives working in the E.U. would be subject to the E.U. third-country association
standards and would face the “E.U. preference of labor market access” that allows positive discrimination for E.U.
workers. After some time, those natives and their descendants (if not naturalized) will be expelled.
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This setting is clearly special, but we claim that it is not wholly unrealistic. Common policies
allowing non-nationals access to local labor markets are often embedded in third-country association
agreements or guest worker programs. These agreements and programs permit the economic immigra-
tion of third-country nationals into a host country under the control of quotas or individualized labor
certifications. For example, the E.U. had such agreements with many Eastern European countries
during the 1990s and still has such agreements with some neighboring countries including Turkey and
Morocco. Hence, our discussion relates to the E.U. decision to adopt a policy of free movement of
workers with Eastern European countries in the 1990s or to the current debate about Turkey’s access
to the E.U. labor market. Our discussion may also be relevant for the popular concerns about migration
issues during the 2005 French referendum about the European Constitution. In North America, the
N.A.F.T.A. includes a policy in favor of free movement of workers. In particular, the TN-status gives the
right to Canadian, Mexican and citizens of the U.S. to work in each other’s countries. The TN-status
is targeted on designated professional occupations, limited to three years but renewable indefinitely.
In practice, the U.S. has implemented a differential treatment for Canadians and Mexicans. Whereas
the TN-status is granted to any Canadian at the U.S. border without control and quotas, it is not
currently offered to Mexican nationals. Thus, our discussion also relates to the U.S. and Canadian
decision to adopt a common uncontrolled mobility of their nationals within the N.A.F.T.A.; it relates to
the U.S. and Mexican decision to remove the present controls and quotas on Mexicans; and it is finally
applicable to the extension of the TN-status to other professional occupations and other countries and
to the U.S. H-1B visa or to the U.S. employment-based green cards, etc.
We suppose that each country has two options: either to adopt the policy of free movement of
workers or to independently control the inflow of workers. Consider the second option, where each
country sets immigration controls. Under our assumptions, a country cannot change the welfare of
its citizens working in the other country and puts no weight on the immigrants residing in its own
jurisdiction. It then follows from the fact that the consumption function Cs(l) is strictly decreasing
that the dominant strategy of each country is to allow no entry to, and not renew any work permit
of, foreign workers. Thus, the second option reduces to no movement of workers. We assume that the
revocation of the right to work is instantaneous, so that any breach from a policy of free movement of
labor means that the allocation of labor reverts straightaway to the initial distribution (L0, L¯ − L0).
Furthermore, and for simplicity, we assume that once the agreement about the policy of free movement
of workers is breached, the countries play their dominant strategy in all subsequent periods so that
there is no movement of labor after a breach.8
8This latter assumption may be relaxed without qualitatively altering the results.
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We say that a policy of free movement of workers is sustainable if and only if no country has an
incentive to deviate from the policy at any date or state given that deviation means an instantaneous
and irrevocable transition to no movement of labor between countries. Let V 0s denote the expected
discounted utility of a worker in the home country in a given state s when workers are not allowed
to cross borders. Analogously to Vs (the expected discounted utility of a worker when there is a
policy of free movement of workers defined in the previous section) it is defined recursively by: V 0s =
us(L
0) + δEqV
0
q . Hence,
V 0s = us(L
0) +
δ
1− δEsus(L
0),
with a similar expression holding for foreign workers. Since a country’s welfare is identified with that of
its representative workers, the policy of free movement of workers is sustainable if and only if Vs ≥ V 0s ;
that is, if
us(Ls)− us(L0) + δ
1− δEq[uq(Lq)− uq(L
0)] ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S, (3)
where Ls and Lq are the equilibrium labor supplies under free movement of workers, with similar
expressions holding for the foreign country. We refer to these conditions as participation or self-
enforcement constraints. These conditions compare the short run cost of immigration (first two terms)
with the long run benefit of the free movement policy (last term). Condition (3) is most stringent for
the state(s) with the highest short run cost, s ∈ arg maxs{us(L0)− us(Ls)}. Similarly, the equivalent
of Condition (3) for the foreign country is more stringent in the state(s) s∗ ∈ arg maxs{u∗s(L¯− L0)−
u∗s(L¯ − Ls)}. That is, if Condition (3) is satisfied in state s, then it is satisfied for all states, with a
similar statement applying to the foreign country at state s∗. Thus, the policy of free movement of
workers is sustainable if and only if
us(Ls)− us(L0) + δ1−δEq[uq(Lq)− uq(L0)] ≥ 0,
u∗s∗(L¯− Ls∗)− us∗(L¯− L0∗) + δ1−δEq[u∗q(L¯− Lq)− u∗q(L¯− L0)] ≥ 0.
(4)
These conditions lead to the following conclusions. First, sustainability is possible only if there are
positive future expected gains. This means that countries must incur shocks in the future that generate
emigration to the country with higher consumption. Second, if there are positive future expected gains,
then there is a critical discount factor δc ∈ (0, 1) such that Condition (4) is satisfied for δ ≥ δc.9
We can also ask how sustainability relates to the agglomeration issue outlined in the previous
9It should be noted that when Condition (4) is satisfied, there is no breakdown in equilibrium. Since these constraints
are forward-looking, the probabilities of states s and s∗ matter only in so far as they affect the long term benefits/costs.
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section, to risk aversion and to permanent differences in the consumption functions of the two coun-
tries. First, recall that excessive agglomeration depends on the sign of dWs/dLs in equation (1).
If dWs/dLs < 0, then the equilibrium labor allocations exhibit excessive agglomeration, and if
dWs/dLs > 0, then the equilibrium labor allocations exhibit under-agglomeration. Either exces-
sive or under-agglomeration mean that the future expected gain Eq[uq(Lq) − uq(L0)] is lower than it
would be if the labor allocation could be chosen optimally. The effect in the short-run is, however,
different. Under-agglomeration will tend to lower the short-run costs of the policy of free movement
of workers, whereas excessive agglomeration will increase the short-run cost. In particular, if there is
excessive agglomeration in state s, then the short run costs of immigration, us(Ls) − us(L0) may be
increased sufficiently to offset any long-term future gains. Thus, factors that cause agglomeration to
be excessive tend to reduce the extent to which a policy of free movement of workers is sustainable.
Such factors will be considered in more detail in the next two sections.
Secondly, the impact of increasing risk aversion is a priori ambiguous. Since it is assumed that
all workers have the same utility function U , risk aversion does not affect the equilibrium labor
allocation, Ls. To the extent to which a policy of free movement of workers reduces the variability
in consumption and the expected labor population Es[Ls] coincides with the initial population L
0,
higher risk aversion is associated with greater long-term benefits of the policy. The effect on the short
run cost us(Ls) − us(L0) is ambiguous, but typically it will decline with increasing risk aversion, so
that the overall impact on sustainability of increasing risk aversion is unclear. However, if workers are
infinitely risk averse, then utility is evaluated by the consumption in the worst state and this is always
improved by a policy of free mobility. Hence, if risk aversion is sufficiently large, there exists a large
enough discount factor δc above which free movement of workers becomes a sustainable policy.
Thirdly, consider a case where there are permanent differences between the home and the foreign
country’s consumption functions. For example, suppose the home country consumption function is
Cs(l) and the corresponding foreign country consumption is λC
∗
s (l) for some parameter λ ∈ (0, 1).10
Consequently, a fall in λ increases the equilibrium labor allocation Ls = Ls(λ) in all states. Since it
reduces the domestic instantaneous utility us(Ls) in all states, condition (3) becomes more stringent
and the critical discount factor above which the free movement of workers is sustained will be higher.
For low enough λ, the long run benefit Eq[uq(Lq)−uq(L0)] becomes non-positive, so that free movement
of workers is never a sustainable policy. We summarize this discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Freedom of movement of workers) The policy of free movement of workers is
never sustainable if it brings no long-run benefit (Eq[uq(Lq)−uq(L0)] < 0). Otherwise, it is sustainable
10Such a parametrization can be justified by the models presented in Sections 4 and 5.
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for high enough discount factor δ (δ > δc). The policy is more likely to be sustainable if workers
are more risk averse. The policy is unsustainable for large enough permanent differences in country
consumption functions (λ small).
Proposition 1 shows that a policy of free movement may be adopted provided there are long
term benefits that outweigh any short term costs. However, it also shows that where there are no,
or small long term benefits, or permanent differences between countries, then such a policy won’t
be sustainable. The latter observation is particularly true for labor flows between developing and
developed countries. As a case in point, European institutions have repeatedly been concerned with
immigration consequence of the policy of free movement of labor. For example, the E.U. has discussed
Italian migration at its inception stage in the 1950s and the migration of Eastern European workers
during its enlargement phase at the beginning of this century. In North America, the TN-status, which
offers permission to work within the U.S. under the N.A.F.T.A., has been subject to huge restrictions
for Mexican natives whereas it has included very few restrictions for Canadians. As in Wellisch and
Walz (1998) and Ortega (2010), this argument shows that developed countries have greater reluctance
to accept migration flows from less developed countries because of a permanent redistribution towards
immigrants.
The conditions for sustainability depend on the distribution of the states of nature and their
associated consumption levels. To aid understanding, improve analytical tractability and discuss the
impact of uncertainty and dynamics on migration incentives, consider then the simplest symmetric
example with two equiprobable and anti-correlated states (similar to the example considered in Bagwell
and Staiger, 1990)). That is, suppose s ∈ S = {1, 2}, C1(l) = C∗2(l) and C2(l) = C∗1(l)∀ l ∈ [0, L¯] while
L0 = L¯/2. This yields the contemporaneous utility levels u1(l) = u
∗
2(l) and u2(l) = u
∗
1(l). Furthermore,
order states so that the state s = 1 is more favorable to the home country and state s = 2 to the
foreign country. Then, C1(l) > C
∗
1(l) and C2(l) < C
∗
2(l), so that u1(l) > u
∗
1(l) and u2(l) < u
∗
2(l).
Free movement of workers implies that us(Ls) = u
∗
s(L
∗
s). Consequently, the favored country attracts
migrants: L1 > L
0 > L2 where L2 = L¯ − L1. Because states are symmetric, the utility level is the
same in all states under free movement of workers: u1(L1) = u2(L2). Furthermore, because u
′
s < 0, we
have u1(L1) < u1(L2) and u
∗
2(L
∗
2) < u
∗
2(L
∗
1). In the short run, countries with a good state can achieve
higher utility levels if they restrict immigration. In this two-state case, the participation constraints
(4) collapse to the single condition
δ
2− δ ≥ G(θ) ≡
u1(L¯/2)− u1(L1)
u2(L2)− u2(L¯/2) , (5)
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where G(θ) > 0 measures the relative cost of adopting the policy of free movement of workers and θ is
a vector of parameters of the utility and consumption functions. The value of G(θ) increases with the
fall in domestic consumption after immigration in the good state (numerator) and decreases with the
rise in domestic consumption after emigration in the bad state (denominator). Because δ/(2− δ) is an
increasing function with a supremum of 1, the policy of free movement of workers is not sustainable
when G(θ) ≥ 1. Using (5), it follows that G(θ) < 1 if and only if u1(L1) > (1/2)(u1(L¯/2) + u2(L¯/2)).
We summarize this discussion in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Two state model) Consider a symmetric model with two equiprobable, anti-correlated
states. Then, the policy of free movement of workers is never sustainable if u1(L1) <
1
2
[u1(L¯/2)+
u2(L¯/2)]. Otherwise, it is sustainable if the discount factor is high enough.
Next we present two models with and without trade that rationalize the properties of the con-
sumption functions we have assumed. We examine the parameter values such that G(θ) < 1 where a
policy of free movement of workers is sustainable if the discount factor is high enough.
4 Standard migration model
In the previous section we have been ambivalent about the source of any long-run benefit from a
policy of free movement of workers. In this section we discuss two principal sources: labor market
flexibility and consumption smoothing. Toward this aim, we embed the above analysis in a simple
model with labor used to produce a non-tradeable good (in Section 5 we will add tradeable goods).
With decreasing returns to scale at the country or firm level, labor demand schedules are decreasing
and therefore, local wages and consumption fall with net immigration. In the remainder of the paper,
uncertainty is represented by country productivity shocks that shift labor demand.
We consider a two-country model in which the home country produces a local non-tradeable good
Zs. The foreign country produces another local non-tradeable good Z
∗
s . The price of these non-
tradeable goods can be normalized to one. For this section, there is no trade and workers consume
only local goods, so that Cs = Zs. Each worker inelastically supplies one unit of homogeneous labor
to the production sector. In the home (foreign) country, Ls (L
∗
s) workers are employed at a wage
ws (w
∗
s). Each country has a unit mass of firms that produce according to the production function
Fs(l) = αsf(l), where f(l) is increasing and concave and αs > 0 measures country productivity. The
foreign country has the same production f(l) but has a productivity parameter α∗ > 0. For our
discussion we will focus on three cases: constant returns to scale where f(l) = l, decreasing returns
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to scale where f ′′ < 0 and the fixed output case where f(l) = 1. In the constant returns to scale case,
each worker’s marginal productivity remains constant irrespective of home country production and
labor force. By contrast, when there are decreasing returns, aggregate production exhibits congestion
as the marginal productivity falls with inward migration. Finally, when f(l) = 1, output is equal
to αs, independently of the size of the labor force. This latter case can be interpreted as a purely
agrarian economy with a random crop of fixed size αs or, as we show below in section 4.4, where both
economies have severe labor market frictions. In what follows it will also be instructive to discuss the
specification where the production function is iso-elastic: f(l) = lβ, β ∈ (0, 1]. In this specification,
the above three cases correspond to β = 1, β < 1 and the limit β = 0 respectively. Finally, for
simplicity we assume that local profits are redistributed to local individuals.
As is standard, it is possible to interpret the extent of decreasing returns as a measure of congestion.
Thus, in the iso-elastic specification, β is inversely related to a measure of congestion. If β = 1, there
is no congestion; increasing labor supply does not impact on the marginal product of existing workers.
If β = 0, production cannot be increased even with extra workers. It is important to understand this
congestion measure. First, the congestion force can be interpreted either at a firm or sector level.
At a firm level, each firm, which hires l workers, can be thought of holding a unit of local indivisible
capital, which embeds either natural resources, such as land or water, or local human resources, such as
local human capital, entrepreneurial skills, etc. At the sector level, decreasing returns to scale can be
interpreted as the sharing of common infrastructures, resources and land. In this case, the production
function Fs(Ls) applies to the production sector with Ls being the sector employment. Then, each firm
can be interpreted as experiencing a sector specific productivity that is equal to F ′s(Ls) = αsf
′(Ls).
Second, the reader may interpret the no-congestion case (f(l) = l) as a case where production involves
capital and labor and where capital is instantaneously and elastically supplied. Third, in a dynamic
setting, if capital is chosen before the realization of productivity shocks, the production function has
decreasing returns to scale in the short-run and labor demand is downward sloping. The fact that
international labor movements may impact negatively on local wages is a possible explanation of the
observed reluctance amongst the public to accept uncontrolled movements of workers.
4.1 Short run equilibrium
In the short run equilibrium, workers consider only current payoffs when deciding whether to move
to another country. For the sake of conciseness, we characterize the variables for the home country,
those for the foreign country being symmetric. Since workers earn the local wage and receive the local
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profit, the value of their consumption is equal to the value of their production: Cs(Ls) = αsg(Ls)
where g(l) ≡ f(l)/l is average productivity (a strictly decreasing function when there are decreasing
returns to scale). With constant returns to scale all workers flow to the country with the higher
productivity shock in each period and state. With decreasing returns under free movement of workers,
and assuming an interior solution, workers migrate until there is equality of purchasing power:
Cs(Ls)
C∗s (L∗s)
=
αsg(Ls)
α∗sg(L∗s)
= 1. (6)
Hence, Ls ≥ L∗s if and only if αs ≥ α∗s. Workers move into the more productive country because
it offers higher purchasing power. The equilibrium population increases with the productivity ratio
αs/α
∗
s.
11 Therefore, using equation (6),
L∗sC
∗′
s (L
∗
s)
LsC ′s (Ls)
=
α∗sL
∗
sg
′(L∗s)
αsLsg′(Ls)
=
L∗sg
′(L∗s)/g(L
∗
s)
Lsg′(Ls)/g(Ls)
.
There is excess agglomeration if and only if this term is less than one. As a special case presented in
Section 2, the allocation of labor is efficient if the production function is iso-elastic (i.e., lg′(l)/g(l) is
constant).
In the two state case, we let z = α1/α2 > 1 measure the relative shock. At the end of this section, we
will also suppose that workers’ preferences exhibit constant relative risk aversion (U(C) = C1−ρ/(1−ρ),
ρ ≥ 0, ρ 6= 1).12
4.2 Labor market flexibility
First we eliminate any insurance motive for free movement of workers and suppose that all workers are
risk neutral (ρ = 0). Thus, any benefits from free movement of workers is derived from the additional
labor market flexibility that allows labor supply to locate where demand for labor is strongest. First,
note that under constant returns to scale (f(l) = l and g(l) = 1), it is easy to check that G(θ), defined
in equation (5), is equal to zero. So, the policy of free movement of workers is always sustainable
for any positive discount factor. In each period and state, all workers flow to the country with the
higher productivity shock. Local citizens keep the same productivity, so that they incur no short run
cost. Immigrants consume what they produce and do not affect the productivity and consumption of
locals. Such a benchmark result is regularly used in the literature to argue about the limited impact
11That is, dLs/d(αs/α
∗
s) = −g(Ls)/(g′(Ls) + g′(L∗s)) > 0.
12For the sake of conciseness, we do not report the case where U(C) = lnC (ρ = 1), although the analysis is essentially
similar.
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of migration policies on local citizens. It will be qualified in the next section.
As argued above, full congestion (f(l) = 1 and g(l) = 1/l) can be interpreted as an agrarian
economy with random crops. The equilibrium allocation of labor depends only on the relative pro-
ductivities: L1/L2 = z or equivalently, L1 = (1/(1 + z))L¯. From this it can be checked that G(θ) = 1
so that a policy of free movement of workers is never sustainable (for δ < 1). Workers have a short
run cost in the good state of nature that is exactly equal to their short run benefit in the bad state.
Risk-neutral but impatient workers will not be prepared to incur this short run cost for an equal but
uncertain benefit in the future.
Similarly, for small productivity shocks, it can be checked that limz→1G(θ) = 1 for any production
functions f . In the limit as z → 1, the (infinitely) small short run cost is equal to the (infinitely) small
short run benefit, so that workers have no incentive to relocate. These two cases highlight the fact
that free movement of workers may not be a sustainable policy simply because the benefits of a policy
of free movement of workers is delayed and uncertain when compared to the costs that are immediate
and known. This occurs even if there is no excess agglomeration of workers.
Next, consider the specification where the production function is iso-elastic (f(l) = lβ) and β ∈
(0, 1). The equilibrium wage is equal to ws = αsβL
β−1
s and the consumption is given by Cs(Ls) =
αsL
β−1
s = ws/β. Without free movement, Ls = L¯/2 and the wages are w
0
s ≡ αsβ(L¯/2)β−1. With
free movement of workers, consumption is equalized across countries so that wages become equal.
By symmetry, the same wage, we, applies in both states. Let α ≡ (1
2
α
1/(1−β)
1 +
1
2
α
1/(1−β)
2 )
1−β be the
‘average’ of the productivity shocks.13 It is easily checked that the equilibrium labor allocation and
wage satisfy:
Les =
(αs
α
) 1
1−β
(
L¯
2
)
; and we = αβ
(
L¯
2
)β−1
, (7)
where Le1 > L¯/2 > L
e
2 and w
e ∈ (w02, w01]. Using z = α1/α2 > 1 and substituting into (5), we can write
G(z, β) =
w01 − we
we − w02
=
z − z
z − 1 .
where the ‘average’ of relative productivity shocks z ≡ (1
2
+ 1
2
z1/(1−β))1−β increases with β and z. It
can be shown that both the differences z− z and z−1 increase with z, but that the latter increases at
a faster rate. Hence, G(z, β) is strictly decreasing in β and z and 0 = G(z, 1) ≤ G(z, β) ≤ G(z, 0) = 1.
The overall effect is determined by two components: the short run cost given by z− z and the overall
13The average here is the weighted power mean of α1 and α2 with power 1/(1− β).
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long term benefit that is proportion to z − 1/2(1 + z). When there is less congestion (larger β), the
short run cost falls and the longer term benefit rises. This yields a smaller critical discount factor for
which the policy of free movement of workers can be sustained. The effect of the relative productivity
shock is more complex because an increase in z raises both the short-term cost and long-term benefit.
Nevertheless, the latter benefit dominates: the larger the relative shock z, the lower the discount factor
that can sustain free movement of labor.
To sum up, when workers are risk neutral, the only benefit from free movement of workers derives
from improved labor market flexibility. Labor supply moves to where the demand is strongest. This is
a long run benefit that must be balanced against the short run cost of migration. For a given discount
factor, if the congestion factor or the shocks are small enough, then the policy of free movement of
workers will not be sustainable.
Proposition 2 (Labor market flexibility) Suppose there is no trade and workers are risk neutral.
Then, the agglomeration of workers is efficient for iso-elastic production functions. The policy of free
movement of workers is always sustainable for constant returns to scale and never sustainable in a
random fixed crop economy. The larger are the shocks or the weaker is the congestion factor (larger β),
the smaller is the discount factor for which the policy of free movement of workers can be sustained.
4.3 Income smoothing
We now turn to the issue of insurance. The policy of free movement of workers also benefits risk averse
workers because it allows them to smooth their consumption by moving across borders. In the previous
section we have established that the policy of free movement of workers is sustainable when workers
are infinitely risk averse. However, one can see that risk aversion has no impact on workers’ location
and consumption when the production technology has constant returns to scale (f(l) = l). This is
because immigration has no impact on local workers’ productivity, earnings or consumption. However,
for full congestion (f(l) = 1), one can show that G(θ) < 1 in the presence of risk aversion. Hence,
in a random crop economy, risk aversion is a motive for workers to accept a policy of free movement
of workers, which they would not do under risk neutrality. The insurance benefit is additional to the
labor market flexibility benefit and offsets the impatience of workers.
Assuming iso-elastic production and preferences with constant relative risk aversion ρ, we can write
G(z, β, ρ) =
z1−ρ − z(1−ρ)
z(1−ρ) − 1 .
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This expression can be shown to fall as ρ increases for all values of z and β. As the coefficient of risk
aversion increases, the cost of the free movement policy decreases because workers have lower marginal
utility from consumption in the good state of nature. Conversely, their benefit increases because they
have higher marginal utility of consumption in the bad state. Hence, increases in risk aversion reduce
the critical discount factor above which the policy of free movement of workers can be sustained. The
insurance motive reinforces the labor market flexibility motivation for the free movement of workers.
We summarize this discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Consumption smoothing) Under constant relative risk aversion, the more risk
averse are workers, the lower is the critical discount factor above which the policy of free movement
of workers can be sustained.
4.4 Wage rigidities
It has been argued that many countries have been reluctant to allow uncontrolled inflows of workers
in times of high unemployment. Boeri and Bru¨cker (2005) present evidence of the hardening of
migration conditions within the E.U., particularly for richer countries with large unemployment levels,
such as France and Belgium. We demonstrate that the existence of unemployment stemming from
labor market rigidities can be a rationale against the adoption of free movement of workers only when
minimum wages have a permanent impact of economic outcomes.
We consider a simple situation where unemployment stems from downward wage rigidities. For
simplicity, the wages ws and w
∗
s cannot fall below minimum wages w and w
∗ that are set exogenously
and independently of whether there is free movement of labor or not. To shorten our discussion,
we focus on identical minimum wages (w ≡ w∗), risk neutral workers and the symmetric two-state
model where z = α1/α2 = α
∗
2/α
∗
1 > 1 and L
0 = L¯/2. Let ls denote the number of employed workers
and Ls denote the population including migrants, so that Ls − ls is unemployment.14 With an iso-
elastic production function, output is αsf(ls) = αsl
β
s . Let l˜s(w) = (w/(αsβ))
1/(β−1) denote the level
of employment at which the minimum wage just binds. Then, the employment level is equal to
ls = min{Ls, l˜s(w)} while the equilibrium wage is given by ws = max{αsβLβ−1s , w}, with symmetric
expressions for foreign variables l∗s and w
∗
s . We also make the simplifying assumption that governments
implement lump sum redistribution to the unemployed, so that employed and unemployed workers
residing in a same country get the same utility. Therefore, irrespective of whether the minimum wage
14The reader can interpret ls as worked hours and Ls − ls as underemployment.
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constraint binds or not, individual consumption can be written as
C˜s (Ls) =
ws
β
ls
Ls
,
where ls/Ls can be interpreted as the employment rate. Recalling that Cs(Ls) = αsL
β−1
s is the
consumption where there is no minimum wage, it is easily checked that C˜s(Ls) ≤ Cs(Ls) with strict
inequality where the minimum wage binds and with equality where it does not.
First, consider the short run equilibrium. In the absence of free movement of workers, minimum
wages bind if l˜s(w) ≤ L¯/2, that is, if w ≥ w0s = αsβ(L¯/2)β−1. For low values of w ≤ w02, the
minimum wage will not bind in either state; for intermediate values, w02 < w ≤ w01, the minimum
wage will bind only in the low productivity state; and for w01 < w it will bind in both states. In the
presence of free movement of workers, consumptions are equalized across countries and also across
states because states and countries are symmetric: C˜1(L1) = C˜2(L¯−L1).15 When the minimum wage
is sufficiently low (w < we), the equilibrium migration and wage (Les, w
e) are given by equation (7)
where we ∈ (w02, w01) and, as in previous sub-sections, there is no unemployment in either country. By
contrast, if w > we, the minimum wage binds, ws = w, and there is unemployment in both countries
with employment levels ls = l˜s(w). Since consumptions are equalized in equilibrium, it follows that
migration is determined by equation (7) and employment rates l˜s(w)/Ls are also equalized across
countries. Since employment is fixed irrespective of migration, there are fixed production levels in
each country and the equilibrium with binding minimum wages has similar properties to the random
crop model (with fixed crop: β = 1) discussed in section 4.2.
To assess the sustainability of the policy of free movement of workers as the minimum wage varies,
we compute the value of
G(w) =
C˜1(L¯/2)− C˜1(L1)
C˜2(L2)− C˜2(L¯/2)
.
There are four cases to consider according to whether the minimum wage lies above or below the
thresholds w02, w
e and w01. First, for w ≤ w02, the minimum wage does not bind in either state, either
in the presence or the absence of migration, so that Proposition 2 applies unchanged. We know from
equation (4.2) in section 4.2 that G(w) < 1 for β < 1 and z > 1. That is, free movement of workers
is sustainable for a high enough discount factor.
Second, for w02 < w ≤ we, the minimum wage binds only in the low productivity country and
in the absence of a free migration policy. That is, absent migration in the low productivity state,
15By symmetry, C˜1(L1) = C˜
∗
2 (L1) and C˜2(L¯− L1) = C˜∗1 (L¯− L1).
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w2 = w > w
2
0 and l2 = l˜2(w) < L¯/2. Recalling that C2(L¯/2) = w
0
2/β, we have
C˜2(L¯/2) = C2(L¯/2)
(
wl˜2(w)
w02
(
L¯/2
)) < C2(L¯/2), (8)
where the inequality follows because the elasticity of labor demand is greater than one and hence,
wl˜2(w) < w
0
2(L¯/2). Equally, because the wage bill, wl˜2(w), is inversely related to w, it follows that
consumption C˜2(L¯/2) falls as the minimum wage rises.
16 Hence, in this case
G(w) =
z − z
z −
(
wl˜2(w)
w02(L¯/2)
) .
The binding minimum wage makes migration more attractive in the low productivity state (denom-
inator), whereas the short run cost to the receiving country does not depend on the minimum wage
(numerator). Equally, it can be seen that G(w) is decreasing in w in this range, meaning that a
higher minimum wage can help sustain the policy of free movement of workers. Intuitively, a binding
minimum wage creates a distortion that, absent free movement, leads to underemployment in the
low productivity country. A policy of free movement of workers allows workers to leave the under-
employment country, which reduces labor supply and raises the wage above the minimum wage. This
eliminates the labor market distortions and inefficiencies caused by downward rigidities in the wage.
The larger the distortion, the greater are the benefits of avoiding it through migration.17
Next, consider a high minimum wage such that w > w01. In this case, the minimum wage binds in
both the high and low productivity countries both with and without free movement of labor. Labor is
determined by its demand and production is fixed irrespective of labor movements. As described above,
employment rates are equalized and the equilibrium shares the same properties as the random crop
model. As a consequence, G(w) = 1 and the policy of free movement is not sustainable. Intuitively,
the short run cost of immigration is exactly matched by the short run benefit of emigration, so that
in the high productivity state, impatient individuals are not willing to bear the short run cost for a
future uncertain gain.
Finally, for we < w ≤ w01, the minimum wage binds when there is free movement while, absent free
movement, it binds only in the low productivity country. In this case, an increase in the minimum wage
16The elasticity of labor demand is 1/(1− β) ≥ 1 with strict inequality for β > 0.
17It follows that a minimum wage in this range improves welfare for some discount factors. For example, without the
minimum wage, there may be no discount factor that sustains the policy of free movement even though it is desirable
because free movement improves average consumption. With the minimum wage, G(w) may be lowered sufficiently that
the policy does become sustainable, improving long run welfare.
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increases the short run cost of immigration in the high productivity state because consumption in the
free movement equilibrium falls with an increase in the minimum wage. In contrast, the consumption
without free movement is unaffected by a change in the minimum wage. Equally, the net benefit of
emigration in the low productivity state also falls: the net benefit of emigration in the low productivity
state is directly proportional wl˜2(w). Thus, G(w) is increasing in this range. In particular, it can be
shown that for we < w ≤ w01,
G(w) =
(
w01(L¯/2)
wl˜1(w)
)
Le1 − (L¯/2)
Le1 − (L¯/2)
.
In this case, w01 ≥ w and L¯/2 ≤ l˜1(w) with equality only if w = w01. Because the elasticity of labor
demand is greater than one, w01(L¯/2) ≤ wl˜1(w), again with equality only if w = w01. Thus, it is
easily seen that G(w) ≤ 1 with equality only if w = w01. To sum up, a higher minimum wage makes
the policy of free movement less sustainable. Intuitively, free movement transmits the labor market
distortion into the high productivity country and does not eliminate it in the low productivity country.
So, workers are less willing to accept the policy of free movements when they face a good shock.
Figure 1: Wage rigidities and relative cost of adopting a policy of free movement of
workers
Comment: The relative cost of adopting the policy of free movement of workers, G, is displayed
as a function of a exogenous common minimum wage. The left panel shows the case of pure
migration (γ = 0). The right panel depicts the economy with almost pure trade (γ = 0.99,
solid line) and an economy with 20% trade (γ = 0.2, dashed line). The policy is sustained for
lower discount factors if G is low. This occurs when only the low productivity country has a
binding minimum wage (at the lowest G).
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The left panel of Figure 1 presents a numerical example of the relative cost of adopting the policy
of free movement of workers, G(w), as a function of the exogenous common minimum wage w (the
right panel will be discussed in section 5.4 when trade is added to the model). As argued above, as the
minimum wage rises, this relative cost G(w) is firstly constant and below 1, then falls and increases
again to reach one. In particular, (i) for high values of the minimum wage (w > w01), a policy of
free movement of workers is not sustainable; (ii) for low values of the minimum wage (w < w02), a
policy of free movement of workers is sustainable for high enough discount factors; (iii) for values of
the minimum wage w02 < w ≤ we, an increases in the minimum wage enhances sustainability (G(w)
is decreasing); (iv) for values of the minimum wage we < w ≤ w01, an increases in the minimum wage
is detrimental to sustainability (G(w) is increasing with G(w) → 1 as w → w02). This pattern might
help explain why some countries with enduring labor market frictions and large unemployment rates
have seen a hardening of migration conditions within the E.U.
We summarize this finding in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 (Effect of a minimum wage) Consider the two anti-correlated state model with
risk-neutral workers. The effect of a common minimum wage on the policy of free movement of
workers is non-monotone. As the minimum wage rises from zero, this policy firstly becomes more
sustainable, then less sustainable and finally unsustainable.
5 Migration and trade model
We now extend our discussion to consider the impact of trade on the sustainability of a policy of free
movement of workers. The adoption of a policy of free movement of workers has often been associated
with agreements on free trade. The E.U. and N.A.F.T.A. both had high levels of internal trade before
adopting policies on the free movement of workers. It is important, therefore, to examine a model
that includes trade as well as migration. As has been noted by a number of authors (see, for example,
Davis and Weinstein, 2002; Felbermayr and Kohler, 2007), migration can have an impact on the terms
of trade and this will feedback to the desirability and sustainability of a policy of free movement of
workers. We therefore extend our model to incorporate trade in a simple and analytically tractable
way.
We consider a Ricardo-Viner model that has two non-tradeable goods (Zs, Z
∗
s ) and two tradeable
goods (Xs, X
∗
s ). The home country specializes in the production of Xs and the foreign country in the
production of X∗s . Individuals consume a Cobb-Douglas composite good Cs ≡ κ Xγ/2s (X∗s )γ/2Z1−γs
where κ is a constant (with a similar expression holding for composite consumption in the foreign
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country). The parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] reflects the preferences for tradeable goods and, given the Cobb-
Douglas structure, the expenditure share on domestic traded goods is γ/2. The standard migration
model of the previous section corresponds to the case where γ = 0. When γ = 1, all goods are traded.
As before, each worker inelastically supplies one unit of homogeneous labor. In the home country,
LXs individuals work in the tradeable good sector while L
Z
s are employed in the local non-tradeable
good sector. Workers move freely between sectors and therefore, are paid the same wage ws in each
sector. Each tradeable and non-tradeable sector includes a unit mass of firms that produce according
to a production function Fs(L
i
s) = αs (L
i
s)
β
, i ∈ {X,Z} where αs > 0 is the country productivity
and β ∈ (0, 1] measures the decreasing returns in the production sector. The productivity parameter
αs is assumed to be identical across tradeable and non-tradeable sectors.
18 The foreign country has
the same production structure (in particular, β is the same across countries), but has a productivity
parameter α∗ > 0. As in Davis and Weinstein (2002), allowing free movement of workers expands the
feasible world production set when technologies across countries are not identical: world production
increases with migration.
5.1 Short run equilibrium
The short run equilibrium consists of a set of prices, wages, income and sectorial labor distribution that
satisfy both profit maximization and market clearing conditions for labor and goods. The solution of
the model is standard and details are given in the Appendix. Firms hire workers so that the marginal
product of labor equals the wage: P isF
′
s(L
i
s) = ws. Firms’ sales and profits are proportional to the wage
bill: P isFs(L
i
s) = wsL
i
s/β. Because production functions are the same across sectors, labor allocates
across the tradeable and non-tradeable sectors according to the product demands: LXs = γLs and
LZs = (1− γ)Ls. The terms of trade (ws/w∗s) adjust to equalize the values of exports and imports and
consequently,
ws
w∗s
=
L∗s
Ls
. (9)
Thus, the terms of trade moves in inverse proportion to the flows of labor. Equilibrium consumption
of the composite good is Cs = (P
X
s )
−γ/2(PX∗s )
−γ/2(PZs )
γ−1Ys/Ls.19 National income is Ys/Ls = β−1ws
and the non-tradeable good price is PZs = (αsβ)
−1[(1 − γ)L]1−βws. The ratio of home and foreign
18This eliminates any bias when we compare the economies with and without trade.
19The constant κ is normalized to cancel out other constants in this expression.
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consumption is
Cs
C∗s
=
(PZs )
γ−1ws
(PZ∗s )γ−1w∗s
. (10)
Substituting for prices gives home consumption as a function of population:
Cs(Ls) = αs
(
α∗s
αs
)γ/2(
L¯− Ls
Ls
)βγ/2
Lβ−1s . (11)
where L¯− Ls = L∗s. Equation (11) provides a specific form for the function described in Section 2.20
Note that, as mentioned in Section 2, unless βγ = 0, consumption is not an iso-elastic function of Ls
and the free labor movement equilibrium is inefficient.
In the equilibrium with free movement of workers, Cs(Ls) = C
∗
s (L
∗
s). For αs > α
∗
s, condition (2),
under which there is excess agglomeration of workers, becomes
L∗sC
∗′
s (L
∗
s)
LsC ′s (Ls)
=
1− β + βγ/2 + (βγ/2) (L∗s/Ls)
1− β + βγ/2 + (βγ/2) (Ls/L∗s)
≤ 1. (12)
For βγ > 0, this is true if and only if Ls ≥ L∗s. Thus, the allocation of labor across countries is efficient
only if Ls = L
∗
s.
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To highlight the differences to the standard model of migration considered in the previous section,
we first discuss an economy that includes only tradeable goods (and constant returns to scale) and
then analyze the general case with both tradeable and non-tradeable goods.
5.2 Pure trade economy
Following Davis and Weinstein (2002), suppose that the economy includes only tradeable goods and
production displays constant returns to scale (γ = β = 1). Even with constant returns to scale,
migration affects consumption through a terms of trade effect. Changes in the terms of trade absorb
productivity differentials between countries, reducing the incentives to migrate. We analyze each of
these effects in turn.
First, immigration has a negative effect on the consumption of home workers through its impact
on the terms of trade. To see this, consider a case where the home country initially has a smaller
population Ls < L
∗
s. By (9), the terms of trade satisfy ws/w
∗
s > 1 before any migration. Suppose
that the home country has a good shock: αs > α
∗
s. Then, by (10), free movement of workers equalizes
20With no traded good, γ = 0, equation (11) reduces to Cs(Ls) = αsL
β−1
s , which was the case studied in section 4.2.
21For βγ = 0, (12) holds with equality and any allocation of labor across countries is efficient.
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consumption, so that Cs/C
∗
s = ws/w
∗
s = 1 and the terms of trade fall. Given constant returns
to scale, immigration does not affect the home country’s purchasing power for the domestic good,
ws/P
X
s = αs, but it reduces that for the foreign good, ws/P
X∗
s = (ws/w
∗
s)α
∗
s. Thus, home workers
lose from immigration through its adverse effect on the terms of trade. The same argument shows
that foreign workers gain. This stands in contrast to the conclusion of the previous section where
immigration had no impact on welfare when firms produce under constant returns to scale. In other
words, immigration increases the production of local goods, which deflates the price of those goods
and consequently the purchasing power of local workers.
Secondly, changes in the terms of trade absorb the effect of productivity differences on consump-
tion and therefore mitigate migration incentives. From (11), it can be seen that home consumption is
LsCs(Ls) =
√
α∗sαs
√
L∗sLs. Consumption depends on the geometric mean of the productivity param-
eters and population sizes. Consider again the symmetric case with two anti-symmetric shocks, which
implies that α∗sαs and LsL
∗
s are constant. Then, the consumption levels do not depend on the states
of nature. The terms of trade fully absorb the productivity shocks because a positive productivity
shock stimulates both local production and income. This leads to an increase in exports and fall in
the export price and, at the same time, the rise in income leads to higher imports and import prices,
which rebalances foreign production and income. With Cobb-Douglas preferences, the terms of trade
effect completely offset consumption differences. Thus, the short run equilibrium in the symmetric
case has no migration: L1 = L2 = L¯/2. Applying this labor allocation in (12), one can see that the
free movement equilibrium is trivially efficient. The same analysis applies in the presence of congested
factors (β < 1) as long as γ = 1. Finally, because consumption is perfectly smoothed across states,
there are no cost and no gain from migration. Countries are therefore indifferent to the adoption of a
policy of free movement of workers. We summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 (Pure trade economy) Consider an economy with only tradeable goods (γ = 1).
Then, immigration leads to changes in the terms of trade that adversely affect local workers. Changes
in the terms of trade also attenuates the consumption discrepancies caused by productivity shocks. In
the two anti-correlated state model, the changes in the terms of trade fully absorb productivity shocks
and eliminate consumption fluctuations altogether: there is no migration in equilibrium and countries
are indifferent to the adoption of a policy of free movement of workers.
In the two anti-correlated state model, a trade policy is a substitute for labor movement policy for
the purpose of income smoothing . Trade is nevertheless not a substitute for migration in the Hecksher-
Ohlin sense, where the movement of factor is equivalent to the movement of goods (Mundell, 1957). In
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this model, each country specializes in the production of its tradeable goods so that workers produce a
different good at a different productivity when they move across border. Also, movements of workers
and commodities are complements in the sense that positive local productivity shocks increase both
export and immigration (Markusen, 1983; Neary, 1995).
To sum up, whereas Davis and Weinstein (2002) highlight the short run cost of migration through
terms of trade between the U.S. and Mexico, this model gives a case for President Salinas’ claim
that emigration may not occur because of trade. Things, however, are different in the presence of
non-tradeable goods and we now turn to that case.
5.3 Economy with tradeable and non-tradeable goods
We now study the more general situation where there are both tradeable and non-tradeable goods
(γ < 1). We focus on the effect of terms of trade and labor market flexibility by assuming that workers
are risk neutral (U(C) = C). In this case, the allocation of workers across countries is given by
L∗s
Ls
=
(
α∗s
αs
) 1−γ
1−β(1−γ)
. (13)
One can check that d(L∗s/Ls)/d(α
∗
s/αs) > 0, while d(L
∗
s/Ls)/dβ < 0 and d(L
∗
s/Ls)/dγ > 0 if αs > α
∗
s.
As expected, for any γ < 1, workers move into the most productive country because the latter offers
higher consumption levels. However, in equilibrium, the labor allocation in the most productive
country decreases with the intensity of local congestion and the share of tradeable goods.
From (12) and (13), it can be seen that the labor allocation across countries is efficient only if
βγ = 0, or γ = 1. Otherwise, there is excess agglomeration. As mentioned in the introduction,
this excess agglomeration occurs because migrants do not internalize the effect of their move on the
productivity and consumption of local workers. There is a missing price: while wages and product
prices give the signals for production and consumption, there is no specific price for the migration
decision.
Proposition 6 The policy of free movement of workers yields excessive agglomeration of workers in
the high productivity country in the presence of decreasing returns to scale and both tradeable and
non-tradeable goods.
Consider again the symmetric country two anti-correlated state model and let L˜ denote the efficient
allocation when the home country has the high productivity shock. Let e = L/L˜ denote the ratio of
the equilibrium to efficient allocation, so that e = 1 corresponds to an efficient allocation and e > 1
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corresponds to excess agglomeration. It can be shown that the equilibrium labor level Ls increases
faster than the efficient level as β rises. When local factor congestion is weaker, agglomeration in
the higher productivity country is more pronounced both in the free labor movement equilibrium and
in the efficient allocation. The externality in the location decisions exacerbates the agglomeration
process at the cost of reducing aggregate consumption. This is because, as β increases, equilibrium
wages become less elastic to the relocation of workers and do not give appropriate location incentives
to workers. Therefore, the agglomeration of workers becomes increasingly excessive for weaker local
factor congestion. Figure 2 plots the contours of e in (γ, β)-space for shock values α1 = 1/α2 = 1.2. It
shows that the excessive agglomeration of workers can be significant. For example, with a moderate
expenditure share on tradeable goods of γ = 0.2 and a weak congestion factor of β = 0.8, the domestic
country hosts 69% of the total population compared to 61% in the socially optimal allocation. Larger
shocks yield more excessive agglomeration.
Figure 2: Excessive agglomeration of workers
Comment: The ratio between the equilibrium and first best numbers of workers, e, is larger
for intermediate trade (γ) and low congestion (high β).
Figure 2 also shows that the impact of trade on excess of agglomeration is non-monotonic with
respect to the size of the tradeable sector. Excessive agglomeration increases with γ for small γ
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while it decreases with γ for large γ. Therefore, the agglomeration of workers is most excessive for
intermediate shares of trade. At the two extremes γ = 0 and γ = 1, the welfare optimum and the
equilibrium allocation coincide.
Agglomeration of workers is most excessive when production has weak congestion and each country
trades a small share of its production. In particular, the more productive country attracts too many
migrants when there exists no congestion (constant returns to scale). This runs counter to the standard
argument that migration is innocuous under constant returns to scale because workers move with both
their constant productivity and consumption to the hosting country. It is explained by the previous
arguments about the effects of the terms of trade. When some goods are not traded, the terms of trade
cannot fully absorb the productivity shocks and there are incentives for migration. Lower congestion
exacerbates these incentives. At the same time, immigration changes the terms of trade, which harms
local workers. Again, as explained before, immigrants increase their productivity and produce more of
the good of the destination country, increase congestion and depress its price and local wages. They
also demand more of the good produced in the low productivity country and increase its price. Local
workers in the more productive country therefore see their wages fall and the price of imports rise. A
planner would prefer to reduce labor movements to partly restore the wages and consumption levels
of those in the more productive country.
We now return to the issue of the sustainability of the policy of free movement of workers. Figure 3
plots the locus of the relative cost of adopting the policy of free movement of workers for the parameters
θ = (γ, β). More precisely, it plots the loci of G(γ, β) = 0.50, 0.75 and 1. These values respectively
correspond to critical discount factors δ = 0.66, 0.85 and 1.22 The shock structure is the same as in
Figure 2. The area (a) corresponds to G(θ) > 1, where a policy of free movement is not sustainable,
and the areas (b) and (c) to G(θ) < 1. The relative cost of adopting free movement of workers, G(θ),
falls as we move to the North-West of the figure. As a result, free movement of workers is more likely
to become a sustainable policy in economies with lower trade and weaker congestion.
Figure 3 also shows that G(θ) increases as more goods are traded (larger γ). Because trade is a
substitute for labor movement for the purpose of income smoothing, free movement of workers is less
useful when trade is important. On the other hand, G(θ) is not monotone with respect to the intensity
of congestion parameter β. Indeed, as we move downward in Figure 3 (β falls), G(θ) firstly decreases
when the parameters (β, γ) lie in the area (b) but it increases when those parameters lie in the area
(c). In the figure, areas (b) and (c) are separated by a dashed curve that corresponds to the locus
22For example, if one considers a time period of ten years between the shocks, these values correspond to annual
opportunity costs of time of respectively 4, 2 and 0 percent (r = δ−1/10 − 1).
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Figure 3: Relative cost of adopting the policy of free movement of workers, G(θ).
Comment: The relative cost of adopting the policy of free movement of workers, G, is related
to the cost of sustaining the policy of free movement of workers. Large trade sectors (γ) makes
the policy unsustainable. Sustainability is not monotone with respect to factor congestion (β).
where the partial derivative ∂G(θ)/∂β = 0. This locus shows, for a given γ, the value of β for which
free movement of workers can be supported for the lowest discount factor. Whereas lower congestion
implies that domestic workers’ productivity and wages are less affected by the inflow of workers, it
also implies that the incentive for migration is not offset enough by the downward pressure on wages
in the high productivity country. Excessive agglomeration of workers occurs and can be so inefficient
that the domestic country does not find it desirable to opt for free movement of workers. In this case,
the short run cost of accepting an excessive inflow of foreign workers in good states of nature does not
outweigh the benefit of the migration option in bad states of nature. We summarize our results in the
following proposition.
Proposition 7 Suppose that workers are risk neutral and that countries face two anti-correlated
shocks. Then, free movement of workers is not a sustainable policy when trade is important and
congestion is weak. Otherwise, there exists a discount factor δ such that free movement of workers
is sustainable. The critical discount factor is lower when fewer goods are traded and for intermediate
values of local factor congestion.
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5.4 Wage rigidities
In this section we reconsider the relationship between the sustainability of free movement of workers
and downward wage rigidities when countries trade. For the sake of simplicity, we again assume an
exogenous common minimum wage ω expressed in each local currency. We assume that the wages ws
and w∗s cannot fall below ωP
X
s and ω
∗PX∗s . As before, let ls and Ls denote the number of employed
workers and the number of residents including migrants. To illustrate the effects of labor frictions, we
consider the simplest example with iso-elastic production function, local income redistribution, risk
neutral individuals and two symmetric states.
The analysis of the minimum wage is very similar to that given in section 4.4. Let l˜s(ω) =
(ω/(αsβ))
1/(β−1). In the presence of a minimum wage ω, the number of domestic employed workers
is ls = min{Ls, l˜s(ω)} while the equilibrium wage is ws/PXs = max{αsβLβ−1s , ω}, with symmetric
expressions holding for foreign variables. The trade balance condition maintains equality of wage bills,
so that wsls = w
∗
s l
∗
s . With the appropriate choice of the constant κ, individual consumption can be
written as:
C˜s (Ls) =
1
Ls
(
wsls
PXs
)1− γ
2
(
w∗s l
∗
s
PX∗s
) γ
2
. (14)
These consumption functions can be used to evaluate G(ω), which is defined in the same way as given
in equation (8). Let ω0s = αsβ(L¯/2)
β−1 denote the thresholds above which the minimum wage binds
in state s when there is no migration. Unlike the case without trade, analyzed in section 4.4, where
the wage is equalized in a free movement equilibrium, here there are two threshold wages with free
movement of labor: below the lower threshold, there is no unemployment in either country; above
the higher threshold, there is unemployment in both countries. Let Les and L

s denote the respective
free movement equilibrium allocations when the minimum wage does not bind in either country and
when it binds in both countries.23 Furthermore, let ωes = αsβ(L
e
s)
β−1 and ωs = αsβ(L

s)
β−1 denote the
associated wages. In the two state symmetric case with γ ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1), we have ω02 < ωe2 < ω2
and ω1 < ω
e
1 < ω
0
1. It is also easily checked that ω

2 ≤ ω1 with strict inequality for γ > 0. With free
movement of labor, we have that the minimum wage does not bind in either country for ω < ωe2 and
it binds for both countries for ω > ω1. This means there are five possible regimes. For ω < ω
0
2, the
23It can be shown that
Les =
 α 1−γ1−β(1−γ)s
α
1−γ
1−β(1−γ)
1 + α
1−γ
1−β(1−γ)
2
 L¯; and Ls =
 α 1−γ1−βs
α
1−γ
1−β
1 + α
1−γ
1−β
2
 L¯
so that L1 > L
e
1 > L/2 > L
e
2 > L

2 for β ∈ (0, 1) and γ ∈ (0, 1).
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minimum wage never binds; for ω ∈ (ω02, ωe2) it binds only in the low productivity country and absent
free movement of workers; for ω ∈ (ωe2, ω1), it binds only in the low productivity country in both the
absence and presence of free movement; for ω ∈ (ω1, ω01), it binds in both countries when there is free
movement, but binds only in the low productivity country when labor is immobile; and finally for
ω > ω01, it binds in all situations.
First, consider the case where the common minimum wage ω ≤ ω02. In this case, the minimum
wage is low enough such that it never binds in either country whether there is free movement of
workers or not. This is the case discussed in section 5.3. Whether free movement is sustainable or
not will depend on the parameter values. In particular, if γ is large enough, the previous results show
that free movement is not a sustainable policy, that is G(ω) > 1 for ω in this range and for γ large
enough. Secondly, consider the case where ω ≥ ω01, so that the minimum wage binds in both countries
whether there is free movement or not. In this case, production is determined by labor demand and
the consumptions are similar to the random fixed crop model.24 Identically to section 4.4, it can be
shown that G(ω) = 1 for a minimum wage in this range.
Following an identical reasoning to that given in section 4.4, it can be shown that G(ω) is decreasing
in ω for ω ∈ (ω02, ωe2). In this case, the minimum wage binds only in the low productivity country and
absent migration. The policy of free movement has the added advantage of allowing workers in the
country with low productivity to emigrate and escape local unemployment. The larger the minimum
wage the greater is this advantage.
Next, consider a minimum wage ω ∈ (ω1, ω01). In this case, the minimum wage binds in both
countries with free movement of labor; whereas it binds in the low productivity country but not in the
high productivity country when labor is immobile. Again, following a similar reasoning to that given
in section 4.4, it can be shown that G(ω) is increasing in ω for ω ∈ (ω1, ω01). This follows because an
increase in the minimum wage increases the short run cost of immigration in the high productivity
state: in contrast, the minimum wage does not affect consumption in the absence of immigration
whereas an increase of minimum wage leads to more unemployment and a fall in consumption in the
free movement equilibrium. In addition, the net benefit of emigration in the low productivity state
also falls: although unemployment rises with a higher minimum wage, per capita consumption falls
less in the presence of migration because some workers leave the low productivity country and reduce
congestion of productive factors there. Thus, it follows that there is some minimum wage such that
G(ω) < 1. Consequently, for some discount factors, a policy of free movement becomes sustainable
24It can be seen from (14), that the total domestic consumption in state s, LsC˜s(Ls) is equal to the (random) constant
(αsβ)
1−γ/2
1−β (α∗sβ)
γ/2
1−β ω−
β
1−β , which is independent of Ls.
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even it were not sustainable with no minimum wage: free movement of workers allows a reallocation
of workers that diminishes the inefficiencies caused by wage rigidities in the low productivity country.
Hence, we can conclude:
Proposition 8 In the two-state economy with risk-neutral workers, traded goods and a common min-
imum wage, the effect of a common minimum wage on the policy of free movement of workers is
non-monotone: there is a non-empty set of minimum wages such that a policy of free movement of
workers is sustainable even if it would be unsustainable without the minimum wage.
We still have to consider cases where ω ∈ (ωe2, ω1). In this interval, when there is free movement
of labor, the minimum wage binds in the low productivity country but not in the high productivity
country. The equilibrium allocation under free movement of workers, L1, is given by the solution of:
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(L1)
1−β(1−γ)
L¯− L1 =
(
α1
α2
)1−γ (
ω
α2β
)β(1−γ)
1−β
.
Although it is difficult to obtain the analytical properties of G(ω) for ω ∈ (ωe2, ω1), it is easy to
compute the solution numerically. The right panel of Figure 1 plots G(ω) for two particular values of
γ: γ = 0.20 and γ = 0.99. The panel confirms that G(ω) can initially be above or below one for a low
minimum wage, but at first decreases to a value less than one, then increases in ω and finally reaches
one for ω > ω01. In particular, it should be noted that for γ close to one, an intermediate value of
the minimum wage allows a policy of free movement to be sustained when such a policy would never
be sustained otherwise. As in the standard migration model, this analysis suggests that labor market
rigidities help to sustain a policy of free movement of workers provided that the rigidities are neither
permanent nor widespread.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the factors that help countries mutually agree on common policies of
unconditional and uncontrolled movement of workers. For the countries to agree on such a policy,
short run costs must be outweighed by long term benefits. While the costs lie in the congestion and
adverse effects of term of trade, the benefits considered here stem from labor market flexibility and
consumption smoothing. Countries facing good productivity shocks incur short run costs because they
allow foreign workers to participate in their local labor markets, which reduces local wages and/or
25It can be checked that the solution of this equation is Le1 when ω = ω
e
2 and is L

1 when ω = ω

1.
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purchasing power. By contrast, countries facing bad productivity shocks benefit from free movement
of workers because they are able to invite their citizens to work temporarily or permanently in more
prosperous countries. We show that such policies are less likely to be adopted when workers are
impatient and less risk averse, when production technologies display decreasing returns and when
countries trade a greater share of their products. Large permanent differences in consumption levels
prohibits the adoption of the policy. The presence of trade increases the cost of immigration cost but
at the same time it mitigates the migration incentives. In the presence of both tradeable and non-
tradeable goods, the policy of free movement of workers is more likely to be sustainable as fewer goods
are traded and for intermediate values of local factor congestion. Finally, wage rigidities improve the
sustainability of the policy provided these rigidities are not permanent.
Our analysis is designed to highlight the role of labor market flexibility and insurance in the
adoption of uncontrolled and unconditional migration. It shows the importance of time discounting,
risk aversion, factor congestion and trade. We consider these to be important ingredients in the
decision of countries to adopt a policy of free movement of labor and believe that the interplay of
trade and congestion offers new insights into the these decisions.
Admittedly, the model is stylized and many other important aspects of the problem are left out
of the account. We have taken as given that immigration always has short-run costs. This may not
be true or only true for particular sectors or skill groups. We have also only considered the case
where migrants remain citizens of the origin country. An earlier version of the paper, Picard and
Worrall (2014), considered the case of a full right migration policy where migrants could acquire
citizenship. It was shown that the full right migration policy is less likely to be sustained than the
free labor mobility policy because it changes the default positions. An important omission is the lack
of skill heterogeneity across workers. With skill heterogeneity, there may be offsetting worker flows in
response to productivity shocks. We have also not considered controlled migration. Although, as we
have argued such a policy is difficult to implement relative to a policy of free movement, a policy of
controlled migration may have efficiency benefits as it may reduce excess agglomeration issues. Equally,
although one of our motivations was to apply the analysis of sustainable trade policies to migration,
we have assumed free trade. We have not considered how the adoption of trade and migration policies
might be coordinated. All these are possible interesting directions for further research.
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Appendix
This appendix derives the short run market equilibrium of Section 5. We proceed in four steps.
First, because profits are redistributed locally we have that national income Ys is equal to the value of
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domestic production PXs Xs+P
Z
s Zs where P
i
s is the price of good in sector i. Second we calculate labor
demand from the condition that the value of the marginal product equals the wage rate, P isF
′
s(L
i
s) = ws,
or equivalently, P isαiβ (L
i
s)
β−1
= ws. This implies that the value of production in each sector is
proportional to the wage bill: P isFs(L
i
s) = β
−1wsLis. The national income in wage units is then equal
to Ys = β
−1wsLs. Third, given the Cobb-Douglas preference individuals spend a share γ/2 of their
income on each of the tradeable goods and a share 1 − γ on the local non-tradeable good. So, the
goods market clearing condition in the non-tradeable sector gives β−1wsLZs = (1 − γ)Ys and hence
LZs = (1− γ)Ls since Ys = β−1wsLs. Then using the labor market clearing condition in the domestic
market we have that LXs = γLs. We can further use these conditions to compute the price of tradeable
and non-tradeable goods in wage units as PXs = (αsβ)
−1(γLs)1−βws and PZs = (αsβ)
−1[(1−γ)Ls]1−βws.
Finally, we consider the market clearing conditions for the tradeable good sectors in the domestic and
foreign countries. With the Cobb-Douglas preference the value of production is equal to the consumers’
expenditure shares: PXs Fs(L
X
s ) = (γ/2)(Ys + Y
∗
s ) and P
X∗
s F
∗
s (L
∗
X) = (γ/2)(Y
∗
s + Ys). Therefore, the
value of production of the tradeable good is the same in both countries: PXs Fs(L
X
s ) = P
X∗
s F
∗
s (L
X∗
s ).
Because the value of production in each sector is proportional to the wage bill (with proportion β) the
wage bills in each country in the tradeable sectors must be equal: wsL
i
s = w
∗
sL
i∗
s . This then further
applies to the non-tradeable sector and hence the equilibrium ratio of wages is ws/w
∗
s = L
∗
s/Ls.
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